Pakistan’s NCA Meet: Bluff More Than Brink

Pakistan's Nuclear Posturing Amid Escalation: Signal or Serious First-Use Threat?

 

 

In the backdrop of escalating military tensions between India and Pakistan, the sudden convening of Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has sent a tremor through South Asia’s already fragile strategic stability. With Indian missile strikes on Pakistani airbases prompting Pakistan’s retaliatory operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos, Islamabad’s decision to gather its top nuclear decision-making body merits close scrutiny—not merely for its optics, but for what it may suggest about the evolving nuclear dynamics on the subcontinent.

India must view this development not just through the lens of immediate provocation but also as part of a broader strategic signalling effort by a beleaguered Pakistani state apparatus that finds itself on the back foot militarily, diplomatically, and politically.

Decoding Pakistan’s Nuclear Signalling

The NCA meeting, under Pakistan’s constitutional structure, is the apex mechanism for nuclear command and control. It encompasses not only civilian leadership but also the top brass of the Army, Navy, Air Force, ISI, and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). Its rare summoning—last done during the 2019 Balakot crisis—suggests a deliberate attempt to remind both India and the international community of Pakistan's nuclear capability and its doctrinal flexibility.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has always thrived on strategic ambiguity. With no declared "No First Use" (NFU) posture, Islamabad has kept its red lines deliberately vague. The 2001 formulation by Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai introduced a framework built on four thresholds—spatial, military, economic, and political—which could trigger nuclear use. However, none of these thresholds have ever been clearly quantified, offering Pakistan both deterrent value and political leverage.

The reality is that Pakistan has consistently used nuclear sabre-rattling as part of its statecraft during periods of conventional inferiority. Given the success of Indian punitive strikes and the evident asymmetry in conventional military strength, Islamabad’s NCA meeting appears more rhetorical than preparatory—more a signal of desperation than intent.

A Crisis of Credibility

Strategically, Pakistan’s full spectrum deterrence policy, complemented by tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), is meant to deter Indian conventional superiority. Yet, the very presence of TNWs—short-range nuclear arms theoretically usable in battlefield conditions—raises troubling questions. Though Pakistan claims centralised control over these weapons, the concept of battlefield deployment implies forward storage and the potential for pre-delegation in wartime—raising escalation risks, especially in a fast-evolving conflict like the current one.

Furthermore, recent revelations—such as Kidwai's 2024 remarks reaffirming Pakistan’s rejection of NFU—underscore Islamabad’s increasing reliance on nuclear brinkmanship. But this comes at a cost. The international community grows increasingly sceptical of Pakistan's nuclear maturity when it uses the threat of a first-strike to deflect attention from internal instability or military setbacks.

In the current context, the NCA meeting may be interpreted as an effort to regain narrative control, project resolve, and stall further Indian military action—not necessarily to authorise imminent nuclear use.

India's Nuclear Doctrine: Credibility with Restraint

India, in contrast, adheres to a clearly articulated nuclear doctrine built on No First Use, Massive Retaliation, and Credible Minimum Deterrence. This doctrine, last formally codified in 2003, remains robust even if recent political rhetoric has hinted at a possible shift toward strategic ambiguity. For now, the NFU policy still underpins India’s posture—one that assures retaliatory capability without inviting pre-emption.

New Delhi’s strategic arsenal is estimated to be marginally smaller than Pakistan’s in numerical terms (around 160-170 warheads), but India holds a qualitative and infrastructural edge. Its delivery systems—Agni-series ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and emerging MIRV capabilities—offer greater survivability and second-strike potential.

Moreover, India’s political control over its nuclear arsenal remains firmly civilian. Only the Prime Minister can authorise a nuclear strike, via the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority. This clarity reduces the risk of accidental or unauthorised use, a concern that shadows Pakistan’s TNW doctrine.

The Real Calculus: Image vs Intent

It is crucial to recognise that Pakistan’s current nuclear posturing, through the NCA meeting, is as much about image management as it is about deterrence. Having suffered precision strikes on critical military infrastructure, and with its conventional deterrent being steadily degraded, Islamabad needs to restore a perception of balance—if not in military terms, then at least in psychological and political domains.

Calling an NCA meeting during an active military conflict serves several purposes:

• International Messaging: It aims to alarm global capitals, especially Washington and Beijing, into interceding diplomatically.
• Domestic Reassurance: It reassures the Pakistani public and military rank-and-file that their leadership is not outmanoeuvred.
• Strategic Leverage: It introduces risk into India’s decision-making calculus, aiming to slow Indian operations through threat of escalation.

Yet, this very posture may backfire. The more Pakistan uses nuclear signalling as a compensatory tool, the more it normalises nuclear threats in conventional exchanges—undermining long-term deterrence credibility.

A Time for Vigilance, Not Alarm

From an Indian perspective, the probability of actual nuclear use by Pakistan in the immediate term remains low. Islamabad understands that any first-use would not only invite catastrophic Indian retaliation but also international condemnation and isolation. The NCA meeting is thus more likely to be a signal flare than a red button.

Nonetheless, India must remain watchful. Strategic signalling must not be mistaken for strategic bluff. While India’s conventional edge and measured doctrine provide a buffer against rash escalation, it is essential that military and political leadership remain fully prepared, not just for conflict management, but also for escalation control.

Deterrence in South Asia rests not only on capability but also on credibility and responsibility. India must maintain its moral high ground, strategic stability, and doctrinal clarity—while being under no illusion about Pakistan’s willingness to exploit nuclear anxiety as an instrument of war and diplomacy.